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Essays 
TENNIS WITH THE NET DOWN: 
ADMINISTRATIVE FEDERALISM WITHOUT 
CONGRESS 
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN† 
ERNEST A. YOUNG†† 
Constitutional law is a funny subject for academics. As scholars, 
we aspire to push forward the frontiers of knowledge—to make new 
discoveries and to think about things in ways that no one has ever 
thought of before. The metaphor of scientific discovery has always 
been somewhat awkward in the social sciences—and perhaps even 
more awkward in law—but surely we all hope to add something new 
to the sum of human knowledge. We are not, to borrow a phrase from 
Oliver North’s lawyer Brendan Sullivan, “just potted plants.”1 
Constitutional law, on the other hand, is all about old. A central 
function of the Constitution in American law is to entrench certain 
structures and rights against change, and every argument—even those 
for progressive reform of our institutions—must be grounded in or at 
least tenuously connected to a text drafted generations ago. 
“Original” in other fields of inquiry means innovative or surprising; in 
 
Copyright © 2008 by Stuart Minor Benjamin and Ernest A. Young. 
 † Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
 †† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. 
We are grateful to the Duke Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in this 
Symposium; to Professors Brian Galle, Mark Seidenfeld, and Gillian Metzger for food for 
thought; to Lisa Bressman and Neil Siegel for helpful comments on the manuscript; and to Arti 
Rai and Allegra Young for putting up with us generally. 
 1. Sullivan spoke up during his client North’s testimony and was told to be silent. Sullivan 
responded, “I’m not a potted plant. I’m here as a lawyer. That’s my job.” Joint Hearings Before 
S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and H. 
Select Comm. to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. 100-7 Pt. I, 263 
(1987) (testimony of Oliver L. North); see also Washington Talk: Briefing; Potted Plants Galore, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1988, at B6. 
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constitutional law “originalism” stands for a hidebound appeal to 
history. The most creative arguments must somehow be couched in 
terms designed to make them seem less daring and more consonant 
with what has gone before. 
Hence the temptation to just cut the cord. It is a truism that the 
founders’ world is not ours, and the problems confronting our polity, 
although not necessarily more difficult, are in many ways different. 
Moreover, no matter how much brilliance and foresight we are willing 
to ascribe to our constitutional founders, it would be surprising if all 
the effort devoted to the study of political institutions over the past 
two centuries had not yielded some progress. And to the extent that 
we think we have identified a new problem or simply come up with a 
better way, it is natural to want to reshape our institutions in 
response—Constitution or no Constitution. It is hard not to start 
tugging at the knots that bind us to the mast. 
American politicians, lawyers, and judges have only partially 
resisted this temptation. We have constructed a national security 
constitution, for instance, that to a significant degree reflects the 
responsibilities and vulnerabilities of a superpower in an age of 
supersonic transport and weapons of mass destruction. On the 
domestic side, we have a centralized administrative welfare state 
exercising authority and undertaking responsibility in ways that 
would have shocked the Framers. And this yields a second central 
dilemma for constitutional scholars, powerfully put by Gary Lawson: 
The actual structure and operation of the national government 
today has virtually nothing to do with the Constitution. There is no 
reasonable prospect that this circumstance will significantly improve 
in the foreseeable future. If one is not prepared (as I am) to hold 
fast to the Constitution though the heavens may fall, what is one 
supposed to do with that knowledge?2 
The thoughtful articles by Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld3 and 
by Gillian Metzger,4 to which this brief Essay responds, offer one 
possible answer to Professor Lawson’s question. Professors Galle and 
Seidenfeld are eminently unwilling to sit with Lawson and watch the 
 
 2. Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1249 (1994). 
 3. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008). 
 4. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 
(2008). 
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heavens fall; they are, moreover, steeped in the latest learning on the 
comparative competence of political, judicial, and bureaucratic 
institutions. Consequently, they are willing to entertain arguments 
that modern administrative agencies are, in fact, better vessels of 
democratic values than Congress, and to acknowledge the claims of 
federalism only if and to the extent that decentralizing authority 
furthers some sort of public policy value.5 Similarly, Professor 
Metzger accepts the value of federalism but argues that it should be 
protected through the operation of ordinary principles of 
administrative law.6 What both articles have in common—other than 
their high quality—is that they shift the focus of federalism doctrine 
from the structures established by the Constitution to the structures 
established by the administrative state. To paraphrase their thesis in 
Lawson’s terms, Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger have chosen to 
“acknowledge openly and honestly, as did some of the architects of 
the New Deal, that one cannot have allegiance both to the 
administrative state and to the Constitution.”7 
For our own part, we are unwilling to adopt this “in for a penny, 
in for a pound” approach to the modern administrative state. The two 
of us often disagree profoundly about the degree of social, political, 
and institutional change that is desirable in a polity,8 but that is a 
dispute about the extent to which institutional structure ought to be 
constitutionally entrenched. Neither of us has any doubt, however, 
that the Constitution we actually have—which neither of us chose, 
but with which both of us are stuck—does entrench certain structures, 
like separation of powers and federalism. Both of these structural 
principles are contestable and open-ended, and we might disagree 
(albeit probably to a less fisticuffs-inducing extent) about their best 
reading in many contexts. But we both think that contemporary 
American lawyers have to maintain continuity with—to make some 
sense of—the constitutional vision of separation of powers and 
federalism notwithstanding the many profound changes to that 
structure that have occurred since 1789. We worry, with Professor 
Lawson, that “[i]f . . . one . . . follows the New Deal architects in 
 
 5. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1936–40. 
 6. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2028. 
 7. See Lawson, supra note 2, at 1253. 
 8. This disagreement has raged since the day we met, as coclerks in August 1995. 
Professor Benjamin would characterize Professor Young as the most egregiously hidebound 
variety of Burkean conservative; Professor Young thinks Professor Benjamin is a Jacobin. 
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choosing the administrative state over the Constitution, one must also 
acknowledge that all constitutional discourse is thereby rendered 
problematic.”9 
The constitutional discourse that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, 
and Metzger propose in their contributions to this symposium 
reminds us of a favorite observation from that noted administrative 
law sage, Robert Frost. In a 1966 interview, Frost commented, “I’d as 
soon write free verse as play tennis with the net down.”10 To our 
minds, the brand of functionalism embraced by our interlocutors here 
amounts to a similar disregard for the constraints that give meaning 
to constitutionalism. Against this anti-Frostian perspective, we insist 
that constitutional text, structure, history, and tradition impose 
meaningful boundaries on the institutional structures available to 
pursue federal policy goals. You can hit a wicked serve with the net 
down,11 but you’re not playing tennis anymore. 
Our response to these papers proceeds in three parts. Part I 
considers Professors Galle and Seidenfeld’s invocation of 
“constitutional realism,” by which they seem to mean that 
constitutional principle must give way to contemporary functional 
realities.12 We think we can discern a similar notion implicit in 
Professor Metzger’s idea of administrative law as a “federalism 
surrogate”—that is, that the established constitutional structures can 
be simply placed to one side and replaced with something else if those 
established structures prove outmoded or ineffective as vehicles for 
protecting more general constitutional values.13 Our discussion 
compares this version with Karl Llewellyn’s quite different version of 
constitutional realism,14 which emphasizes the extent to which 
extratextual institutions and practices supplement the constitutional 
“work” of the 1789 document but does not claim that the basic 
principles of the canonical document could be simply shoved aside for 
policy reasons. We like to think we are constitutional realists too, but 
 
 9. Lawson, supra note 2, at 1253. 
 10. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 295 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 
1996). 
 11. In some variants of beer pong, for example, the net is removed from the ping pong 
table in order to facilitate a very low and fast serve. See Dartmouth Beer Pong, WIKIPEDIA.COM 
(available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dartmouth_pong) (last visited May 31, 2008). 
 12. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1938–39. 
 13. See Metzger, supra note 4, at 2059. 
 14. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934). 
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we prefer Professor Llewellyn’s version to the ones on offer 
elsewhere in this symposium. 
Part II focuses more specifically on questions of administrative 
law and in particular administrative federalism. We discuss Professors 
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger’s focus on agencies and why we think 
it is inadequate. Expansive notions of the Commerce Clause have 
largely cast aside the protections for states that dual federalism and 
other mechanisms once offered, but conventional wisdom holds that 
the states retain some measure of protection by way of the procedural 
and political safeguards of federalism.15 On the separation of powers 
side, the death of the nondelegation doctrine threatened to eviscerate 
the central assumption that Congress makes the laws. As with 
federalism, though, this problem has been thought to be mitigated by 
Congress’s continued supremacy over agencies and the availability of 
judicial review to enforce the statutory limits of agency authority.16 
We are largely willing to accept these rationales; we think, however, 
that by elevating the administrative agency itself to the primary role, 
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger shatter the fragile constitutional 
compromises that allow present institutional arrangements to 
maintain continuity with traditional constitutional structures. 
In Part III we discuss how our approach differs from that of 
Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger. In our view, the 
touchstone of any analysis must be what Congress intended, not what 
agencies can do to improve on Congress. This is not only old-
fashioned but also may prove cumbersome for an agency that wants 
to act quickly and (let us suppose) has states’ best interests at heart. 
We thus concede that our approach might not be as conducive to 
optimal policymaking as the alternative focus proposed by Galle, 
Seidenfeld, and Metzger. (We do not think, however, that our 
insistence on traditional structures would preclude adopting many of 
the federalism-protective administrative mechanisms that our 
colleagues champion here.) But the more traditional approach does 
 
 15. See infra Part III.A. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
 16. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, 
questionable in light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the 
Constitution, have been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to 
ensure agency fidelity to whatever statutory directives have been issued.”). 
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have the virtue of allowing us to call ourselves constitutional lawyers 
and still look ourselves in the mirror each morning. 
The central thrust of Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger’s 
argument is to propose a different form of federalism to be enforced 
through a different set of institutional mechanisms. This might be an 
entirely sensible prescription for a new constitution in a newly-
established federal system. But for us, constitutionalism means that 
we are simply not free to choose whatever normative principles and 
institutional strategies we think best. We must, to borrow a phrase 
from our days in Texas, “dance with the girls that brung us.” 
I.  TWO KINDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REALISM 
The anti-Frostian articles in this symposium represent a more 
general trend in administrative law that focuses on federal agencies 
themselves as the situs for protecting constitutional values such as 
separation of powers, federalism, and democratic accountability. Our 
friend Lisa Bressman’s work, for example, has questioned 
conventional views of agencies as implementing a discernible intent 
of Congress17 or as democratically accountable through an elected 
president18 and has instead emphasized the importance of procedural 
mechanisms at the agencies as a means of promoting political control 
and preventing arbitrariness.19 A parallel trend in constitutional law 
more generally emphasizes other nontextual institutional structures, 
such as political parties, as vehicles for protecting constitutional 
values.20 In each instance, the impulse is to look beyond the hardwired 
features of the Constitution—such as Congress’s representational 
features and lawmaking processes set forth in Article I—for alternate 
institutional mechanisms. 
 
 17. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Interpreting Regulatory Statutes in Light of Legislative Realities, 
58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 8–10, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
[hereinafter Bressman, Interpreting Regulatory Statutes].  
 18. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 493–503 (2003). 
 19. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1749, 1796–1804 (2007). 
 20. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 234–52, 278–87 (2000) (arguing that federalism is best 
protected by political party dynamics rather than judicial enforcement of textual limits on 
Congress’s powers); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2385 (2006) (suggesting that “the separation of powers as the Framers 
understood it . . . ha[s] ceased to exist” and that “[t]he enduring institutional form of democratic 
political competition has turned out to be not branches but political parties”). 
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This school of thought finds its ne plus ultra in the work of 
Edward Rubin, who insists that 
many of the basic concepts that we use to describe our current 
government are the products of social nostalgia. The three branches 
of government, power and discretion, democracy, legitimacy, law, 
legal rights, human rights, and property are all ideas that originated 
in pre-administrative times and that derive much of their continuing 
appeal from their outdated origins. . . . [T]hese concepts are simply 
not the most useful or meaningful ones that we could find to 
describe contemporary government.21 
Dean Rubin would thus replace much of the traditional discourse in 
constitutional and administrative law with technocratic notions of 
“administration,” institutional “microanalysis,” and a unified 
governmental “network.”22 This analytical shift goes considerably 
further than anything proposed by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and 
Metzger, but it shares their impulse to set aside “outmoded” 
constitutional structures and ways of thinking and replace them with 
more “realistic” modes of analysis. 
We find much to admire in this vein of scholarship, and we would 
be the first to concede that extraconstitutional mechanisms play an 
important role in the vindication of constitutional values. What 
troubles us is the notion that the hardwired constitutional 
mechanisms can be left behind or, failing that, pushed to the sidelines 
in favor of more promising institutional strategies. The constitutional 
structure builds in a vast amount of play in the joints, but we do think 
attention to certain hardwired institutions and processes is 
nonoptional. Prominent among them is the centrality of Congress’s 
legislative decisions in our constitutional scheme. With respect to 
changes in state authority, an agency’s role is whatever Congress 
gives it, and no more. Congress’s choices are the touchstone. 
 
 21. EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE 
MODERN STATE 2 (2005). Although Dean Rubin does not mention federalism in this particular 
passage, he has made his contempt for people who care about federalism clear in other work. 
See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994) (“When federalism is raised as an argument against some 
national policy, we generally reject it by whatever means are necessary, including, in one case, 
killing its proponents [the Civil War]. This Article . . . asserts that, on grounds of political 
morality, it has been exactly the right thing to do.”). 
 22. See RUBIN, supra note 21, at 22–36 (administration); id. at 18 (microanalysis); id. at 48–
53 (networks). 
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In making this point, we do not propose to quarrel in detail 
(much) with Professors Galle and Seidenfeld’s comparative 
institutional analysis or with Professor Metzger’s account of the 
Supreme Court’s administrative law decisions. (We are not entirely 
convinced on either score, but point-by-point refutation is not our 
interest here.) Nor do we propose to offer a detailed affirmative 
account of how we would address problems of federalism in the 
administrative state, such as the preemptive powers of federal 
agencies. One of us has addressed the administrative preemption 
question in detail elsewhere,23 but we despair of ever agreeing on 
particular doctrinal prescriptions. What we think we can agree on24 is 
a more general approach to these questions as a matter of 
constitutional theory. We begin, therefore, with a crucial distinction 
that is explicit in the Galle and Seidenfeld article and seems to be 
implicit in the Metzger article—the distinction between constitutional 
realism and formalism. 
A. The Anti-Frostian Take on the Structural Constitution 
Although Professors Galle and Seidenfeld invoke “constitutional 
legal realism,”25 they do not spend much time fleshing out what they 
mean. What we take them to mean is that legal structures must reflect 
the functional realities of effective governance—as opposed to the 
“formal” requirements grounded in constitutional text and history. 
The proper allocation of authority between administrative agencies, 
courts, and Congress thus turns on a sophisticated and nuanced 
evaluation of comparative institutional competence, and that 
competence is directed toward protecting federalism only to the 
extent that federalism “improve[s] the regulatory process”—there is 
no independent normative significance to “the preservation of state 
regulatory prerogatives per se.”26 We think it is thus fair to say that 
the Galle and Seidenfeld view has two components: (1) contemporary 
institutional structures should take whatever form best promotes the 
relevant public values, and (2) those values are defined in 
consequentialist terms (“improving the regulatory process”) rather 
than in terms of fidelity to some value handed down from the 
constitutional Framers. 
 
 23. See Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008). 
 24. And frankly, this is something of a pleasant surprise. 
 25. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1994. 
 26. Id. at 1949. 
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This formulation may sound a bit more radical than anything 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld have come right out and said in their 
article, but we think it is a fair generalization from their particular 
claims and, more fundamentally, the method by which they support 
those claims. The entire point of the Galle and Seidenfeld article is to 
attack doctrines requiring federal intrusions on state regulatory 
authority to come from Congress, rather from federal administrative 
agencies,27 the most prominent of which is the presumption against 
preemption.28 These doctrines, Galle and Seidenfeld argue, are 
misguided because agencies are in fact more transparent, deliberative, 
and accountable than Congress and because agencies are better at 
determining the allocation of regulatory authority that will promote 
good policy outcomes.29 They give zero attention to claims that the 
Constitution may simply require Congress to make these calls, not 
because Galle and Seidenfeld are unaware of such arguments but 
because such arguments do not count in their jurisprudential world. 
As they frankly acknowledge, “[t]he story we have given so far 
depends on a willingness to acknowledge that the legal realism that 
animates administrative law also should inform constitutional 
doctrine.”30 The alternative, in their view, is a kind of “formalism” 
that is blind to institutional realities.31 
Although Professor Metzger does not explicitly invoke legal 
realism, it seems reasonable to attribute to her much the same view, 
at least with respect to the fungibility of institutional structures. Her 
very title—Administrative Law as the New Federalism—suggests the 
 
 27. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld explain the crux of their argument: 
That problem, of course, raises a question of its own: who best to decide how best to 
divide [power between states and the federal government]? With some modest 
exceptions, most courts and commentators have looked to Congress. Federal courts 
have done little to limit federal power directly. Instead, they have insisted on rules 
that give primacy to Congress, but also impose some burden on Congress to make 
good decisions. We argue in this Article that this allocation is a mistake, and that 
instead federal agencies should often be the preferred institutions in which to vest the 
authority to allocate power between states and the federal government. 
See id. at 1936 (footnote omitted). 
 28. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). On the tension between 
the Rice presumption and doctrines of deference to agencies, see, for example, Damien J. 
Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory Preemption Cases, 87 
GEO. L.J. 263, 264, 268–74 (1998). 
 29. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1992. 
 30. Id. at 1994. 
 31. See id. We doubt that “formalism” is the right word for the view that Professors Galle 
and Seidenfeld oppose. See infra text accompanying notes 71–78. 
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replacement of outmoded institutional structures (which may just 
happen to be in the Constitution) with new governance 
arrangements.32 And Metzger’s central thesis is to suggest that 
administrative law may function as a “surrogate” for constitutional 
federalism, protecting values of state autonomy via the workings of 
the administrative state in lieu of either judicially-enforced 
substantive limitations on national power or adherence to political or 
process limits.33 Unlike Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, Professor 
Metzger does not appear to dismiss these more traditional limitations 
as obsolescent formalism; she does, however, think that constitutional 
constraints are largely beside the point in administrative federalism 
cases because the Supreme Court has construed the relevant 
constitutional limitations so broadly.34 And she insists that “for 
federalism to have continued vibrancy as a governing principle, it 
needs to be ‘normalized’ and consciously incorporated into the day-
to-day functioning of the federal administrative state.”35 The original 
Constitution may have envisioned a particular set of political and 
procedural safeguards for state autonomy, but—in Metzger’s view—
contemporary interpreters remain free to substitute another set of 
surrogate safeguards if those alternative structures would better 
promote public values.36 
The second component of the view we have ascribed to our 
interlocutors—that the public values to be enforced by institutional 
structures should be defined in consequentialist terms—is easier to 
establish. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld begin by pointing out that 
“there is really not one federalism but two”37: 
One form, which some commentators have termed “abstract 
federalism,” can be thought of as political or rights oriented. In this 
 
 32. Cf. Wikipedia, The New Black, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_new_black (last visited 
May 31, 2008) (“‘_____ is the new black’ is a catch phrase and snowclone used to indicate the 
sudden popularity or versatility of an idea at the expense of the popularity of a second idea. It is 
also the origin of a snowclone of the form ‘X is the new Y.’”). For those not hip enough to know 
what a “snowclone” is, see Glen Whitman, Phrases for Lazy Writers in Kit Form Are the New 
Clichés, AGORAPHILIA, http://agoraphilia.blogspot.com/2004_01_11_agoraphilia_archive.html# 
107412842921919301 (Jan. 14, 2004, 17:00). 
 33. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2070. 
 34. See id. at 2045–48. For an example, see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198, 2201 
(2005) (construing Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause to reach in-state, 
noncommercial production of medical marijuana). 
 35. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2087. 
 36. Id. at 2093. 
 37. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1941. 
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conception, federalism preserves the states as a source of power that 
rivals the federal government, so that competition between the two 
for the loyalty of the public constrains any tendency towards tyranny 
or other bad behavior. The second, economic conception, values 
federalism because—and only to the extent that—it may tend to 
increase overall national welfare or utility.38 
As the language we have already quoted suggests,39 Galle and 
Seidenfeld have little use for abstract federalism. When they analyze 
the comparative competence of institutions to protect federalism, 
“the issue is not which institution best enables state influence over 
regulation, but rather which institution fosters state influence that will 
enhance public welfare, and not simply state officials’ opportunities 
for rent seeking.”40 This approach is diametrically opposed to that of 
someone like Justice O’Connor, who insisted that “[o]ur task would 
be the same even if one could prove that federalism secured no 
advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising our preferred system 
of government, but of understanding and applying the framework set 
forth in the Constitution.”41 For Galle and Seidenfeld, federalism is 
purely instrumental, and its claims extend only insofar as it “may tend 
to increase national welfare or utility.”42 The value of constitutional 
fidelity espoused by Justice O’Connor has no independent weight in 
this analysis.43 
Pinning this consequentialist label on Professor Metzger’s article 
is harder, but we have our suspicions.44 Metzger seems to accept an 
 
 38. Id. at 1941–42 (footnotes omitted). 
 39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 40. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1949. 
 41. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). 
 42. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1942; see also id. at 2021 (“We have argued that the 
realist view of federalism recognizes that the principle of limited federal power is an 
instrumental one.”). 
 43. See id. at 1949 (stating that their analysis “credits the availability of dual sovereignty 
only as a functional matter—that is, only when that availability is related to regulatory outcomes 
and not simply out of some posited formalistic preference for protection of dual sovereignty”). 
 44. Consequentialism may be endemic to administrative law experts (although Justice 
Scalia seems to have avoided the bug thus far). See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 18 (2005) (“Since law is connected to life, 
judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to consequences, including 
‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected.’” 
(quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 109 (3d ed. 1960))); Ken I. Kersch, Justice 
Breyer’s Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 766 (2006) (characterizing Justice Breyer’s 
jurisprudence as driven by attention to the purposes of legislation and the consequences of 
resolving disputes about those purposes in particular ways). 
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obligation to protect federalism as part of the constitutional 
enterprise; her proposal is simply that one set of institutions (ordinary 
administrative processes) are better suited to promote that value than 
another (judicial insistence that Congress make the decision to 
supplant state law). In this sense, then, we may read Metzger as 
adopting the first part of Professors Galle and Seidenfeld’s position 
but not the second. On the other hand, Metzger strikes us as 
particularly fainthearted about promoting federalism in any way that 
might limit federal authorities’ ability to achieve their policy goals.45 
This suggests an implicit consequentialism similar to that of Galle and 
Seidenfeld: federalism is a value only to the extent that it does not 
pose a cost in terms of social utility.46 
As we have already suggested, the setting aside of constitutional 
constraints that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger propose 
brings to mind Robert Frost’s criticism of free verse.47 Although we 
would be the first to concede that constitutional text, history, and 
tradition leave a great deal of play in the joints—indeed, a great deal 
of room for Galle and Seidenfeld-style analysis of comparative 
institutional competence48—the constraints of text, history, and 
tradition nonetheless form the net across which constitutional tennis 
must be played. Like Frost, we find the game unrecognizable (and not 
much fun) in the absence of these constraints. Nor do we accept that 
one must adopt the anti-Frostian view represented by Galle, 
Seidenfeld, and Metzger as part of any “realistic” approach to 
jurisprudence. We develop our own view of “constitutional realism” 
in the next Section. 
 
 45. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2073. 
 46. Put more precisely, federalism itself has no inherent value to weigh against any 
decrease in utility that might result from interference with federal policy goals. 
 47. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 48. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 308–17 (2007) (applying 
comparative institutional analysis to patent law); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism 
Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1733, 1740–58 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Making Federalism Doctrine] (arguing that 
the Constitution’s provision for federalism allows sufficient room for courts to make 
“compensating adjustments” over time); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two 
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 65–122 (2004) [hereinafter Young, Two Federalisms] (applying 
comparative institutional analysis to federalism doctrine). 
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B. Llewellyn’s Realism and the Constitution Outside the Constitution 
Although we often think of legal realism as primarily a private 
law phenomenon, the realists also had important things to say about 
public law. A leading example—and one that echoes some of the 
concerns of this symposium’s articles—is Karl Llewellyn’s essay on 
The Constitution as an Institution.49 This essay draws on the basic 
realist distinction between the “law in the books” and the “law in 
action”50 to understand the “Constitution” as encompassing not 
simply the canonical text but also the large set of statutes, regulations, 
practices, and norms that have grown up around the text to give 
shape and life to the institutions of actual governance. Hence, 
Professor Llewellyn derides as “extraordinary” the “notion that the 
primary source of information as to what our Constitution comes to, 
is the language of a certain Document of 1789, together with a 
severely select coterie of additional paragraphs called 
Amendments.”51 Llewellyn instead seeks to identify the elements of a 
“working constitution,” and he insists that “[a]s a criterion of what 
our working Constitution is, the language fails in both directions. It 
affords neither a positive nor a negative test.”52 This working 
constitution includes, for example, subconstitutional rules like the 
voting rules in the Senate and even informal norms such as the pre–
Twenty-Second Amendment understanding that presidents would 
generally serve no more than two terms.53 
It is worth pausing for a moment to ask what is really “realist” 
about Professor Llewellyn’s working constitution. Lawyers commonly 
think of legal realism as focused on indeterminacy in the law. 
According to Brian Leiter, the realists meant two things by 
indeterminacy: 
first, that the law was rationally indeterminate, in the sense that the 
available class of legal reasons did not justify a unique decision (at 
least in those cases that reached the stage of appellate review); but 
second, that the law was also causally or explanatorily 
 
 49. Llewellyn, supra note 14. 
 50. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 61 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2003) 
(noting “a disjunction between the ‘law in the books’ and the ‘law in action’” as characteristic of 
legal realism). 
 51. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 3. 
 52. Id. at 15. 
 53. See id. at 15–17. 
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indeterminate, in the sense that legal reasons did not suffice to 
explain why judges decided as they did.54 
One might, we suppose, understand Llewellyn’s notion of a working 
constitution as a claim that the canonical document is “causally or 
explanatorily indeterminate”—that is, that the canonical document 
does not suffice to explain the governing institutions that we actually 
have. There is something to this, as Llewellyn plainly set out to 
debunk traditional legal culture’s focus on the canonical text. But 
Llewellyn’s claim—at least in this work—is not that the canonical 
constitution was indeterminate (in either sense) with respect to the 
matters it addresses, but rather that it is incomplete—that it fails to 
address any number of important issues of governance, and that other 
rules and practices have grown up around the canonical document to 
fill these gaps. This position has little to do with what Professor Leiter 
calls the “core claim” of legal realism: “in deciding cases, judges 
respond primarily to the stimulus of the facts of the case, rather than 
to legal rules and reasons.”55 In fact, Llewellyn’s claim about the 
Constitution has little to do with deciding cases at all. Rather, it is a 
general claim about the relative unimportance of the divide between 
“constitutional” and “ordinary” law in structuring the way our 
institutions operate outside the courts. 
What is “realist” about Professor Llewellyn’s idea of a working 
constitution is its empiricism and its disregard of formal categories of 
law in favor of how law actually operates in practice.56 For Llewellyn, 
“[a] realist is one who, no matter what his ideological or philosophical 
views, believes that it is important regularly to focus attention on the 
law in action at any given time and to try to describe as honestly and 
clearly as possible what is to be seen.”57 Part of this is a claim about 
the importance of norms not formally enshrined in binding law: much 
 
 54. Leiter, supra note 50, at 51. 
 55. Id. at 52; see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 123 
(1995) (“[T]he realist assumption . . . was that judges—stimulated, primarily, by the facts before 
them rather than by the rules to which those facts might be fitted—work backwards ‘from a 
desirable conclusion to one or another of a stock of logical premises.’” (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Max Radin, The Theory of Judicial Decision: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 
359 (1925))). 
 56. See DUXBURY, supra note 55, at 71 (“‘Realism’ describes accurately what was possibly 
the single unifying ambition of so-called realists: namely, the commitment to candour, to telling 
it—whatever ‘it’ happened to be—as it is.”). 
 57. WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 74 (rev. ed. 
1985). 
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as Llewellyn thinks that judges enforce the norms of commercial 
culture in commercial cases,58 he also thinks that informal norms play 
an important role in constituting the government.59 But many aspects 
of the working constitution are “hard” law—that is, statutes, 
legislative rules, and the like. And these provisions of law may 
operate in a highly determinate sense. The realist point is simply that, 
in order to appreciate the full scope of our constitutive institutional 
arrangements, one has to set aside the formal category of 
“constitutional law” and look at the roles that various sorts of legal 
measures actually play in the system.60 
One of us recently sought to develop Professor Llewellyn’s 
conception by drawing an analogy to the British constitutional 
tradition, which lacks a single document codifying the polity’s 
constitutive institutional arrangements and entrenching those 
arrangements against change.61 In the British tradition, “constitutional 
law” is defined by function rather than form; a law is part of the 
Constitution if it performs a constitutive function—e.g., establishing 
an institution or conferring rights on individuals. Accordingly “the 
Constitution” consists simply of all the laws and practices that 
perform these functions.62 As Professor Llewellyn suggests, our own 
American Constitution can be thought of in much the same way: our 
“working constitution” consists not only of the original document and 
its formal amendments, but also laws like the 1789 Judiciary Act (and 
its subsequent amendments) that established the federal courts, the 
various civil rights statutes conferring important rights on individuals 
 
 58. See Leiter, supra note 50, at 58. Norms play a significant role in many areas of law (and 
legal scholarship). See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 88–115 (1999) (discussing the role of 
norms in science). 
 59. The obvious analogy is to the use of “conventions” in the British system. See ADAM 
TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 10–12 (2003). 
 60. See DUXBURY, supra note 55, at 96–97 (stressing the empiricism of the realists). 
 61. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 
408 (2007) [hereinafter Young, Outside the Constitution]. On the British Constitution, see 
TOMKINS, supra note 59, at 1–30. For a similar analogy between Llewellyn’s realism and New 
Zealand’s unwritten constitution, see Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to 
Identify the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 
587 (2006). We note that our other coclerk, Heather Gerken, has been kind enough to describe 
Professor Young’s article as a “signal[] that the end of the world is nigh.” Heather K. Gerken, 
The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic 
Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 932 (2007). 
 62. See, e.g., A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 22–23 (8th ed. 1915). 
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(including rights against government action) that go beyond the rights 
articulated in the Bill of Rights, and practices such as the internal 
House and Senate rules that establish the committee structure and 
rules for voting on legislation. 
An important difference between our system and Britain’s, of 
course, is that elements of our constitutive arrangements—those that 
are a part of the canonical document—are entrenched against change 
through “ordinary” legislation.63 But we think that difference is less 
critical, in most circumstances, than people sometimes think. For one 
thing, formal entrenchment of the Article V variety is not the only 
thing that makes a legal norm hard to change; it seems much more 
likely, for instance, that we will see in our lifetime a constitutional 
amendment to allow the prohibition of flag burning than a repeal of 
the Social Security program.64 But more important is the fact that the 
canonical Constitution simply does not speak to a very great number 
of constitutive issues in any significant degree of detail. It leaves those 
issues for ordinary legislation to work out. We are convinced, 
moreover, that this is a feature, not a bug, in our system: it leaves the 
great bulk of our institutional arrangements open to change and 
adaptation over time.65 Bruce Ackerman is thus right to say that the 
“constitution” has been amended over the course of our history 
outside the Article V process,66 but we think those amendments have 
occurred much more frequently and incrementally than they do in his 
 
 63. For an argument that British law is beginning to reflect a distinction between ‘higher’ 
and ‘ordinary’ law, see MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD & SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 4 (2000). 
 64. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 61, at 426–28. 
 65. Our great friend Sanford Levinson has argued that this perspective understates the 
extent to which, on certain critical issues like the malapportionment of the Senate or the 
distortions that the Electoral College produces, the canonical text does amount to an “iron 
cage” that prevents necessary reforms. See Sanford Levinson, Reconsidering the Syllabus in 
“Constitutional Law,” 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 7, 9–10 (2008), http://thepocketpart. 
org/2008/05/16/levinson.html. We are not nearly as worked up about those problems as 
Professor Levinson, but in any event we suspect that extracanonical reforms can in fact fix or at 
least mitigate many of them. See Ernest A. Young, Curricula and Complacency: A Response to 
Professor Levinson, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 12, 15 & n.15 (2008), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2008/05/16/young.html (pointing out, for example, that a proposed 
interstate compact could render the popular vote decisive in presidential elections with the 
concurrence of as few as eleven states). 
 66. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
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account. In particular, they have occurred through “ordinary” 
legislation rather than “higher lawmaking.”67 
The administrative state is surely part of this “constitution 
outside the Constitution.” The great organic statutes that establish 
and empower the various agencies—the Communications Act of 
1934, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Clean Air and Water 
Acts, and other key environmental laws—are all quintessentially 
constitutive statutes. These laws establish enduring institutions of 
governance; their preemption and savings clauses sketch the 
boundary of state and federal power; they confer both substantive 
and procedural rights upon individuals. The Administrative 
Procedure Act and executive orders allocating power between the 
agencies and the White House play similar constitutive roles that cut 
across multiple areas of regulatory action. We suspect that a 
constitution that tried to entrench the level of institutional detail 
represented in these statutes would prove insufficiently flexible to 
endure over time. We differ from Karl Llewellyn, then, to the extent 
that he suggested that the working constitution should be “not subject 
to abrogation or material alteration.”68 Much of the utility of our 
extracanonical constitution derives from the fact that it can be 
changed through ordinary legislative processes or even more informal 
means in response to the shifting needs of society. 
Having embraced the institutional flexibility of the 
administrative state, then, why do we reject the vision of 
administrative federalism advanced by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, 
and Metzger? Although we would follow Professor Llewellyn in 
acknowledging how much of our “constitution” consists of ordinary 
law, subject to alteration and adaptation in response to contemporary 
circumstances, we think our interlocutors improperly disregard the 
role of the canonical, entrenched Constitution. To return to our 
Frostian analogy, we admit that most of what is interesting about 
tennis consists in angles, spin, power, and position—it has little to do 
with the net.69 So it is with the structural constitution: the canonical 
 
 67. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 61, at 448–59; see also Ernest A. 
Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda, 10 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399 (2008). 
 68. Llewellyn, supra note 14, at 29. 
 69. Or so we infer from watching people who are actually good at tennis. On the rare 
occasions when we play, the net plays an extremely significant role. Most of our shots end up 
there. 
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text does not determine most of the interesting institutional design 
questions, and contemporary political actors enjoy significant 
discretion to order things to their liking.70 But certain key entrenched 
requirements remain, and our concern is that our anti-Frostian 
friends have impermissibly set them aside. Tennis with the net down 
isn’t really tennis at all. 
C. Formalism, Functionalism, and Constitutionalism 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld reject this view—that the 
Constitution simply requires a focus on Congress, regardless of the 
possibility that administrative agencies may have superior 
institutional competence—as a kind of “formalism.” As Lawrence 
Solum has noted, however, “[t]he terms ‘formalism’ and ‘formalist’ 
are thrown around quite a bit, but they turn out to be surprisingly 
difficult to define.”71 It is worth pausing for a moment to assess the 
senses in which our position is and is not formalist, as that inquiry 
may help illumine the extent and limits of our disagreement with our 
interlocutors. 
Leading definitions of “formalism” involve excluding various 
sorts of considerations from legal decisions. Frederick Schauer’s 
influential account, for example, equates formalism with rule-based 
decisionmaking: 
At the heart of the word “formalism,” in many of its numerous uses, 
lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule. Formalism is 
the way in which rules achieve their “ruleness” precisely by doing 
what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a 
 
 70. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (suggesting that presidential authority is almost always a function of 
the consistency of executive action with congressional legislation); Ernest A. Young, Toward a 
Framework Statute for Supranational Adjudication, 57 EMORY L.J. 93, 95–100 (2007) (suggesting 
that structural questions concerning the relationship between domestic and supranational courts 
are largely undetermined by the canonical Constitution and should be resolved through 
framework legislation). 
 71. Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 043: Formalism and Instrumentalism, LEGAL 
THEORY LEXICON, http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-043-
formalism-and.html (May 22, 2005, 14:10); see also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 
509, 509–10 (1988) (“Even a cursory look at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it is 
for decisions in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever formalism is, 
it is not good.”). 
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decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would 
otherwise take into account.72 
On this account, the opposite of formalism is standard-based 
decisionmaking, under which a decisionmaker applying a legal 
directive may have direct recourse to that directive’s underlying 
reasons.73 We take Professors Galle and Seidenfeld to mean 
something similar by “functionalism”—that is, they contend that the 
allocation of authority between Congress and administrative agencies 
should be settled not by the constitutional principle that the 
Constitution vests legislative authority in Congress,74 but rather by 
assessing more directly whether Congress or agencies better promote 
the Constitution’s underlying values.75 They assert, for example, that 
an assertion of “exclusive judicial or congressional power to decide 
the appropriate scope of national authority” would be illegitimate 
because such an assertion “cannot be squared with the basic 
rationales of federalism,”76 not because such an assertion would be an 
incorrect interpretation of the Constitution’s provisions. 
Our contrasting view legitimately may be characterized as 
“formalist” in the following sense: we think that if the Constitution is 
fairly read to vest decisionmaking responsibility in Congress, then it is 
not open to us to inquire whether underlying constitutional values 
might be better served by vesting that responsibility elsewhere. But 
this kind of formalism is inherent in the very notion of 
constitutionalism itself. It is exactly the same idea that keeps us from 
 
 72. Schauer, supra note 71, at 510; see also Solum, supra note 71 (“The core idea of 
formalism is that the law (constitutions, statutes, regulations, and precedent) provide[s] rules 
and that these rules can, do, and should provide a public standard for what is lawful (or not).”). 
Adrian Vermeule has identified “two senses of formalism,” both of which involve limiting the 
considerations available to a decisionmaker: first, an “attempt to deduce legal rules from 
intelligible essences, such as ‘the nature of contracts’ or ‘the rule of law,’ while excluding 
considerations of morality and policy,” and second, a “rule-bound decision-making strategy,” 
under which “judges . . . should restrict the range of information they attempt to collect and 
reduce the complexity of their behavioral repertoire.” ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (2006). 
 73. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like 
when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background 
principle or policy to a fact situation.”). 
 74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 75. Cf. Schauer, supra note 71, at 537 (“Understanding the way in which rules truncate the 
range of reasons available to a decisionmaker helps us to appreciate the distinction between 
formalism and functionalism, or instrumentalism.”). 
 76. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1939. 
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asking in every Fifth Amendment case whether the Constitution’s 
underlying norms are really well served by a principle foreclosing self-
incrimination (much less whether those underlying norms are the 
right norms to have). That refusal to require that constitutional 
directives be justified anew in every case is part of what it means to 
say that the Constitution is entrenched. 
To say, however, that that we must do whatever the Constitution 
requires, without examining its underlying justifications, is not to say 
that we should interpret the meaning of those constitutional 
requirements in a formalist way. For example, one could vindicate the 
principle that all agency authority must ultimately be traced back to 
Congress by requiring a formal “clear statement” of delegation in the 
text of the statute, but one could also argue, as Lisa Bressman does, 
that finding broad delegations to agencies whenever certain 
functional considerations are present best implements Congress’s 
intentions.77 If the constitutional principle is simply that Congress’s 
intent must be followed, one might adopt either formalist or 
functionalist approaches to ascertaining that intent.78 
Our disagreement with Professors Galle and Seidenfeld—not to 
mention Professors Metzger and Bressman—may well extend to 
questions of constitutional meaning, such as the proper interpretation 
of the Constitution’s lawmaking provisions. The important point for 
present purposes, however, is that that disagreement would not be a 
disagreement about realism or about formalism. We are entirely open 
to the need to assess constitutional structure in realist terms, and in 
many respects we are willing to interpret that structure in a 
functionalist way. Where we jump off the train is at the proposition 
that the Constitution’s hardwired provisions, however construed, may 
somehow be subordinated to its underlying values or, even worse, to 
consequentialist notions of good policy. 
II.  THE LEGITIMATING ROLE  
OF CONGRESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
So far we have sketched a contrast between two different realist 
views of how the structural constitution changes in response to 
 
 77. See Bressman, Interpreting Regulatory Statutes, supra note 17 (manuscript at 46). 
 78. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 72, at 33 (“[T]he best reading of the Constitution is 
that interpretive formalism and interpretive anti-formalism are constitutionally optional for 
judges.”). 
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changing conditions over time. Our own Frostian view is that the 
Constitution leaves many institutional questions open to be resolved 
by a more mutable “constitution outside the Constitution,” but that 
the features that the canonical Constitution does speak to must be 
respected. The anti-Frostian view that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, 
and Metzger espouse, on the other hand, holds that contemporary 
actors are free to adopt whatever structures seem likely to best realize 
public values and that (at least for Galle and Seidenfeld) those values 
are essentially consequentialist in character. This is a general 
disagreement about constitutional theory, but it arises in a very 
specific context concerning the means by which federalism may be 
protected in the modern administrative state. In this Part, we apply 
the somewhat abstract points developed above to this specific dispute 
about administrative federalism. 
A. Foundational Considerations in Administrative Federalism 
It may be a stretch to say that the issue of administrative 
federalism will ever be “hot,” but for a complicated issue of 
intergovernmental relations involving intricate matters of statutory 
construction and administrative law, the topic has attracted a 
surprising amount of interest lately.79 One reason is that although the 
Rehnquist Court’s “federalist revival” generated a great deal of 
academic interest in federalism,80 an emerging consensus recognizes 
 
 79. In addition to this symposium, many of the articles in the Northwestern Law Review’s 
2008 symposium on preemption engaged that question in an administrative context. See, e.g., 
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008); 
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 841 (2008); 
Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 23; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and 
Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption]; 
Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory 
Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1995); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by 
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007) 
[hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble]. On preemption more generally, see the essays 
in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein & 
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
 80. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle? 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998) (coining the term “federalist revival”). The 
leading cases on the (canonical) constitutional side are Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997) (holding that Congress may not commandeer state executive officers by requiring them 
to enforce federal law), Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress 
may not, when using its Article I powers, abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from private 
suits for money damages), and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the 
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that the Court’s holdings under the Commerce Clause, 
anticommandeering doctrine, and Eleventh Amendment are likely to 
make considerably less difference than how the Court approaches 
questions of statutory and administrative preemption.81 Another 
source of the current interest lies in the Bush administration’s 
aggressive assertions of executive power, and in particular its use of 
administrative agency action to achieve policy goals that it could not 
achieve through the legislative process.82 Finally, the Supreme Court 
has decided a string of cases all involving—but none definitively 
resolving—basic questions concerning the role of federal 
administrative agencies in the federal system, with another pair of 
potentially defining decisions teed up for next term.83 
One set of questions in administrative federalism focuses on the 
quality and processes of decisionmaking at the agency. For example: 
 
federal Gun Free School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). For a 
general account of this line of cases, see Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 48, at 23–32. 
 81. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(observing that preemption cases present “the true test of federalist principle”); Calvin Massey, 
Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 508 (2002) (underscoring 
preemption’s significant implications for federalism); Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 48, at 
130–34 (attempting to place preemption at “the center of our federalism debates”). 
 82. See, e.g., Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 227–28 (describing an 
administrative process of “silent tort reform”); Joel Brinkley, Out of Spotlight, Bush Overhauls 
U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/14/politics/ 
14bush.html?ex=1250136000&en=1bf32d7574b25b2b&ei=5090) (discussing the Bush 
administration’s expansive use of agency authority). For additional citations, see Metzger, supra 
note 4, at 2025 n.3. 
 83. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) (avoiding 
deciding how much deference to accord agency preemption determinations by basing the 
Court’s holding that state law was preempted on the Court’s independent interpretation of the 
underlying statute); Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914–21 (2006) (refusing to defer to the 
attorney general’s interpretation of the Controlled Substance Act as authorizing regulations 
preempting Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide law); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861, 883 (2000) (placing “some weight” on the agency’s conclusion that state law posed an 
obstacle to executing federal policy); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495–97 (1996) 
(giving “substantial weight” to the Food and Drug Administration’s construction of the Medical 
Devices Amendments not to preempt the Lohrs’ claims); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 
U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (deferring to an agency’s construction of a statute in a preemption case, but 
distinguishing “the question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a statute 
[from] the question of whether a statute is pre-emptive” and “assum[ing] (without deciding) that 
the latter question must always be decided de novo by the courts”). The new cases are Altria 
Group, Inc. v Good, 501 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1119 (2008) (raising 
questions concerning, inter alia, the scope of agency authority to preempt state law by informal 
action), and Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 192–94 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 
(2008) (raising the question of how much deference is due a federal agency’s interpretation of 
its decisions’ preemptive effect). 
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If an agency can preempt state law in the exercise of a general 
delegated authority, should preemptive effect be limited to agency 
actions of a particular kind—e.g., notice-and-comment rulemaking?84 
What should be the effect of agencies’ failure to comply with 
executive orders mandating that they consider the federalism impacts 
of proposed actions before reaching a final decision?85 
Those questions assume a focus on agencies. More foundational 
are questions involving the relationship between the agency and 
Congress. Some of these concern the authority of federal 
administrative agencies to preempt state law. For instance, when a 
federal administrative agency interprets an ambiguous federal statute 
as preempting state law, is the agency’s interpretation entitled to 
judicial deference?86 If so, what degree of deference? Relatedly, to 
what extent can Congress delegate the authority to preempt state law 
on the agency’s own initiative? How clearly must such delegations be 
stated? Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger largely focus on 
this second set of questions. 
In our view, answering the second set of questions must start 
with Congress. To be sure, the Court has acknowledged Congress’s 
ability to delegate significant powers to administrative agencies. As 
Justice White pointed out in dissent in INS v. Chadha:87 
[T]he sheer amount of law—the substantive rules that regulate 
private conduct and direct the operation of government—made by 
the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by 
Congress through the traditional process. There is no question but 
that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or realistic 
sense of the term.88 
But without denying the truth of Justice White’s statement, the Court 
has always insisted that administrative agency action be grounded in 
and defended in terms of the action of Congress itself. Hence, in 
Chadha, the majority responded that 
 
 84. See Young, Executive Preemption, supra note 23, 891–92, 899 (suggesting that it 
should). 
 85. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 79, at 782–85 (discussing 
agencies’ generally miserable record of compliance with such orders). 
 86. See id. at 739–43 (parsing this question and recommending that Skidmore, not Chevron, 
deference applies); Merrill, supra note 79, at 728–30 (recommending that courts adopt a 
preemption-specific deference analysis). 
 87. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) 
 88. Id. at 985–86 (White, J., dissenting). 
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[e]xecutive action under legislatively delegated authority that might 
resemble “legislative” action in some respects . . . . is always subject 
to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that 
authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the 
power of Congress to modify or revoke the authority entirely.89 
Chadha was not a preemption case, but its rigorous insistence on 
the primacy of the Article I lawmaking process has important 
implications for administrative preemption issues. We contend that 
the Constitution requires that the central decision to preempt state 
law be meaningfully traceable to Congress—not simply to the will of 
the agency itself. This flows from the structure of the Constitution. 
Indeed, it is hardwired into the Supremacy Clause. That provision 
confers the status of supreme federal law only on three sorts of 
enactments: the Constitution; “the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States.”90 
Administrative regulations, adjudicatory rulings, and the like are not 
“Laws of the United States” within this language because they are not 
made “in Pursuance” of the legislative process laid out in Article I; 
rather, their effect as supreme federal law is necessarily parasitic 
upon the supremacy of the underlying statutes that authorize 
administrative action. Further, Article I, section One vests “[a]ll 
legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United 
States,”91 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the 
particular lawmaking procedures specified in that Article are not 
subject to modification through ordinary legislation.92 All supreme 
legislative authority, then, stems from Congress acting through 
specified procedures.93 
This point does not mean that administrative actions cannot be 
“law” under the Supremacy Clause. Rather, we simply insist that 
agency actions have the status of supreme law because they are made 
pursuant to delegations from Congress; the force of agency actions is 
 
 89. Id. at 953–54 n.16 (majority opinion). 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 92. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998) (striking down the line-item 
veto); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (striking down the legislative veto). 
 93. As we discuss in Part III, the Court has implemented this principle through developing 
a variety of “clear statement” requirements that insulate the states from federal interference 
absent explicit congressional decisions to the contrary. See infra notes 135–38 and accompanying 
text. 
03__BENJAMIN_YOUNG.DOC 10/22/2008  10:16:51 AM 
2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITHOUT CONGRESS 2135 
derivative, not primary.94 We think the Court put it reasonably well in 
Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC:95 
[A] federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is 
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority. 
This is true for at least two reasons. First, an agency literally has no 
power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a 
sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it. 
Second, the best way of determining whether Congress intended the 
regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law is to 
examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress 
to the agency.96 
This will strike many as an obvious point, but even obvious points can 
do some work. Congress is the touchstone, and that suggests a quite 
different focus from that suggested by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, 
and Metzger. 
That does not mean that the first set of questions are not 
important, or even that those are not also constitutional questions—in 
the sense that the answers to those questions are not also constitutive 
of the functional relationship between the nation and the states. We 
do insist that the answers to the second set of questions must flow 
from the guideposts created by the entrenched, canonical 
constitution. An analysis of the constitutional guideposts is thus not 
optional in the sense that the first set of questions might be. And that 
is the nub of our disagreement with Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and 
Metzger. 
 
 94. It may be helpful to compare the status of federal agency action with that of federal 
common law, which may also preempt state law in the event of a conflict. We doubt anyone 
would say, however, that judge-made rules that fill gaps in federal statutes, for example, are the 
same as the federal statutes themselves. As one of us has demonstrated elsewhere, the 
preemptive force of federal common law derives from the supremacy of the underlying federal 
legislative enactments. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 125). 
 95. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986). 
 96. Id. at 374. The Supreme Court came closest to equating administrative regulations and 
federal statutes in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), 
stating that “[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes,” id. at 
153. But the Court immediately turned its focus back to Congress by noting that “Congress has 
directed [the] administrator to exercise his discretion” and that the administrator’s actions were 
“subject to judicial review . . . to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority.” 
Id. at 153–54; see also id. at 152 (“The pre-emption doctrine, which has its roots in the 
Supremacy Clause, requires us to examine congressional intent.” (citation omitted)). Nothing in 
de la Cuesta suggests that agency actions have preemptive force apart from underlying 
congressional action. 
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B. Shifting the Focus to Agencies 
Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger reason that agencies 
are no worse, and probably better, decisionmakers than Congress in 
determining whether state laws should be preempted. Galle and 
Seidenfeld, in particular, emphasize several dimensions of 
comparative institutional competence that, in their view, favor federal 
agencies over Congress and the courts as the venue for contemporary 
federalism debates. Agencies, they say, are more deliberative, 
transparent, and accountable than Congress.97 Metzger likewise 
contends that “[n]umerous factors, such as congressional oversight, 
federal officials’ ties to state regulators, lobbying by state political 
organizations, and dependence on state implementation, can all serve 
to give state regulatory interests leverage in federal agency 
decisionmaking,” and she emphasizes that “administrative law [may] 
offer[] adequate protection against agency failure to take federalism 
concerns seriously.”98 
The specific doctrinal conclusions that both articles seem to draw 
from these insights strike us as relatively modest. Professors Galle 
and Seidenfeld would reject the “trend of modern doctrine toward 
requiring in all cases clear congressional authorization for preemption 
or other expansions of federal power.”99 Professor Metzger focuses 
less on critique than on developing the notion that ordinary 
administrative law may protect federalism interests, but she likewise 
seems to reject requirements “that Congress . . . clearly authorize 
burdens that administrative agencies impose on the states.”100 Our 
focus in this reply is not on the specific rejection of clear statement 
rules, but rather on the sort of analysis that forms the basis for that 
conclusion. 
In particular, we reject the notion that administrative federalism 
should focus on the agencies rather than Congress. That notion 
emerges most clearly at the beginning of the Galle and Seidenfeld 
article: 
Federal courts . . . have insisted upon rules that give primacy to, but 
also impose some burden upon, Congress to make good decisions. 
Our goal in this article is to show that this allocation is a mistake, 
 
 97. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1939. 
 98. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2072, 2080. 
 99. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1940. 
 100. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2095. 
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and that instead federal agencies should often be the preferred 
institution in which we should vest authority to allocate power 
between states and the federal government.101 
Similarly, Metzger would shift the focus of administrative federalism 
from the constitutionally-prescribed role of Congress to agency 
decisionmaking and administrative law: 
One central implication is that the Court should apply 
administrative law doctrines with an eye to reinforcing agency 
attentiveness to state interests. Another is that addressing 
federalism concerns through ordinary administrative law may often 
prove more effective than devising special federalism-inspired 
doctrines.102 
Significantly, Metzger concludes that “federalism . . . needs to be 
‘normalized’ and incorporated into the day-to-day functioning of the 
federal administrative state.”103 
As we have already suggested, our interlocutors’ approach 
addresses the ends of constitutional structure—the protection of 
federalism or of other democratic values—while sidelining particular 
institutional mechanisms that the constitutional text prescribes for 
meeting those ends. Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger 
suggest that if agencies can do a reasonable job of protecting states’ 
interests, then everyone should be happy: the goals of federalism will 
be met. We need not insist upon congressional authorization for 
agency action, because everyone knows that Congress does not do a 
very good job of protecting states’ interests.104 This view presupposes 
that it is the Constitution’s underlying values that really matter—not 
the particular mechanisms that we have traditionally relied upon to 
vindicate those values. There is no reason to insist on Congress’s role 
 
 101. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1936. 
 102. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2099. 
 103. Id. at 2091. 
 104. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 20, at 223–27 (demolishing many of the traditional 
arguments that the states’ representation in Congress protects the institutional interests of the 
states); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1460 (2001) (likening reliance on politics to 
safeguard federalism to “reinforcing the walls of a sand castle as the tide returns”); William 
Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 139, 147–52 (1998) (suggesting that changing political realities have undermined 
what few political safeguards existed). 
03__BENJAMIN_YOUNG.DOC 10/22/2008  10:16:51 AM 
2138 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:2111 
as a protection for the states if the agencies are even better suited to 
perform that role. 
The Supreme Court rejected a very similar argument in Whitman 
v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.105 In that case, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had proposed that the 
solution to the problem of broad delegations of power to agencies 
was to require the agencies themselves to issue regulations 
constraining their own exercise of the delegated authority.106 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected that suggestion: 
We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful 
delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a 
limiting construction of the statute. . . . The idea that an agency can 
cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by 
declining to exercise some of that power seems to us internally 
contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to 
exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard that 
Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden 
legislative authority. Whether the statute delegates legislative power 
is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has 
no bearing upon the answer.107 
 
 105. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 106. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d 
in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
Where (as here) statutory language and an existing agency interpretation involve an 
unconstitutional delegation of power, but an interpretation without the constitutional 
weakness is or may be available, our response is not to strike down the statute but to 
give the agency an opportunity to extract a determinate standard on its own. Doing so 
serves at least two of three basic rationales for the nondelegation doctrine. If the 
agency develops determinate, binding standards for itself, it is less likely to exercise 
the delegated authority arbitrarily. And such standards enhance the likelihood that 
meaningful judicial review will prove feasible. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 6–8 (D.C. Cir. 
1999), rev’d in part on other grounds, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (elaborating, on petition for rehearing, 
upon the court’s prior delegation holding). The circuit court acknowledged that 
[a] remand of this sort of course does not serve the third key function of 
nondelegation doctrine, to “ensure[] to the extent consistent with orderly 
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by 
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.” The 
agency will make the fundamental policy choices. 
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 175 F.3d at 1038 (alteration in original) (quoting Indus. Union Dep’t, 
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). 
Nonetheless, the court found that sacrifice worth making because “the remand [would] ensure 
that the courts not hold unconstitutional a statute that an agency, with the application of its 
special expertise, could salvage.” Id. 
 107. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472–73. 
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It is possible, of course, that the Court was wrong to dismiss so 
quickly the D.C. Circuit’s innovative solution to the delegation 
conundrum. But we do think American Trucking highlights the extent 
to which our interlocutors’ proposal—that administrative mechanisms 
can be substituted for legislative ones so long as underlying 
constitutional values are served—is a departure from more familiar 
forms of constitutional doctrine. 
In defense of the constitutional legitimacy of their position, we 
imagine that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger might make 
two different arguments.108 First, they might say that the step they are 
taking is fairly small and that we have exaggerated the extent of their 
departure from more traditional assumptions about constitutional 
structure. Second, they might simply insist that it is too late in the day 
to challenge the constitutionality of the administrative state. We 
address the first of these arguments in the remainder of this Section 
and the second in the next. 
Professor Metzger suggests that we have exaggerated the 
conceptual distance between her view and ours when she notes that 
“Congress is far from absent under the administrative law approach, 
notwithstanding this approach’s primary focus on agencies.”109 She is 
surely right to observe that, when we insist that “the central decision 
to preempt state law [must] be meaningfully traceable to Congress,”110 
“[m]uch depends on the degree of clarity that ‘meaningful 
traceability’ requires.”111 All the participants in this debate seem to 
accept the proposition that the initial delegation of authority must 
come from Congress, and none have questioned the nondelegation 
doctrine’s vestigial requirement that such delegations be 
accompanied by an “intelligible principle” that guides the exercise of 
agency discretion. Metzger thus notes that:  
administrative law enforcement of federalism does not lose the 
political safeguards justification that animates process federalism 
but instead amplifies the political safeguards available by giving 
weight to state interests in executive branch policy debates as well 
 
 108. Both arguments, in fact, were advanced in our colloquy at the symposium. See 
Symposium, 38th Annual Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Symposium: Administrative 
Law, Preemption, and Federalism, http://realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/spring08/students/ 
04152008.rm (Apr. 15, 2008). 
 109. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2094. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 90. 
 111. Metzger, supra note 4, at 2094. 
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as by rendering the effects of agency decisions on the states more 
transparent and thus more subject to congressional oversight.112 
We acknowledge that, in some respects, the administrative 
agency mechanisms that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger 
celebrate may add an additional layer of protection for federalism 
within the executive branch, and we consider in Part III whether that 
is a good thing.113 The important question for present purposes, 
however, is whether our interlocutors’ proposals undermine the role 
of Congress in protecting the states from federal preemption. That is 
a hard question to evaluate as a matter of positive law simply because 
the existing doctrine is so unsettled. But we think that what makes 
these articles so original and interesting is precisely their suggestion 
that current law’s focus (such as it is) on Congress is misplaced and 
that constitutional values would be better served by shifting the 
inquiry away from Congress and onto the structure and processes of 
the agencies themselves. If administrative law really is “the new 
federalism,” that suggests at least some degree of willingness to part 
ways with the old legislative mechanisms.114 
Consider, for example, the current controversy over agency 
regulations promulgated with preambles stating a broad view of the 
federal law’s preemptive effect. Such preambles have been issued in a 
variety of areas, including federal drug regulation, motor vehicle 
regulation, and product safety.115 According to Professor Sharkey, 
“[t]he regulatory preemption debate centers on the extent to which 
the preambles go beyond simply reciting the preemptive effect of the 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Professor Young thinks it is; Professor Benjamin thinks it isn’t. See infra p. 2113. Part 
III also identifies ways in which these administrative mechanisms may provide considerably less 
protection, as a practical matter, than an approach that insists upon congressional action. See 
infra text accompanying notes 155–63. 
 114. Cf. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 242 (“Congressional intent is at 
the heart of conventional preemption analysis.”). 
 115. See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription 
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,922, 3,934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (“FDA approval of labeling under the act . . . preempts conflicting or 
contrary State law.”); Tresa Baldas, FDA’s Pre-emption Rule Splits the Courts, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 
30, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1178183076770; Sharkey, 
Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 230–42 (surveying actions by the Food and Drug 
Administration, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission). Professor Sharkey suggests that “these preemption preambles 
may be only the tip of the iceberg—a harbinger of a future where federal agency regulations 
come armed with directives that displace competing or conflicting state regulations or common 
law as a matter of course.” Id. at 227–28. 
03__BENJAMIN_YOUNG.DOC 10/22/2008  10:16:51 AM 
2008] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITHOUT CONGRESS 2141 
governing statute or regulation promulgated within the agency’s 
delegated authority, and instead attempt to discern the proper scope 
of preemption with little or no direction from Congress.”116 On our 
view of the law, such preambles would add relatively little to a 
preemption inquiry; the preemptive effect of federal law would have 
to be grounded in actions by Congress, not the agency’s judgment. 
But it seems likely that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger 
would approach the question quite differently by focusing on the 
processes and reasoning of the agency itself. Unless we have 
profoundly misread them, our interlocutors would care far less than 
we would about the extremely attenuated role that Congress plays in 
such cases. 
In any event, our purpose here is not so much to prove our 
symposium guests wrong as to insist on the continued primacy of 
Congress in preemption decisions. To the extent that Professors 
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger accept that primacy, we are certainly 
happy to embrace them. But we suspect that the shift we detect in 
these articles is, in fact, a meaningful one, and to that extent we hope 
to provide a reminder that legislative authority must always be 
grounded in action by the states’ representatives in Congress. 
C. “That Ship Has Sailed” 
The second possible answer to our critique raises the interesting 
and difficult question of how one approaches the question of 
constitutional limits on the administrative state. At one extreme, one 
could conclude that the administrative state is hopelessly 
unconstitutional and thus that no more further discussion need 
occur.117 At the other extreme, one could decide that the basic 
questions of separation of powers have been resolved in favor of 
administrative agencies, so that contemporary constitutional debate 
must take their legitimacy as given. Arguments like ours, which 
continue to treat agencies as constitutionally suspect in at least some 
important ways, are thus outside the scope of relevant constitutional 
debate. We take this to be the position of Professors Galle, 
Seidenfeld, and Metzger. It is not so much that the arguments against 
broad delegation of authority to agencies are implausible, but rather 
 
 116. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 79, at 243. 
 117. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 2, at 1249 (stating that he is willing “to hold fast to the 
Constitution though the heavens may fall”). 
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that it is simply too late to make those arguments. That ship has 
sailed. 
This is, without a doubt, a plausible position. Neither of us—not 
even Professor Benjamin, on his most Jacobin days—is eager to 
uproot the administrative state, even if we were handed power to do 
so. And although it is fun to play the curmudgeon and grumble about 
the constitutional liberties taken during the New Deal and Great 
Society, we also confess that we prefer our constitutional arguments 
to be at least somewhat relevant to the world we actually live in. 
Nonetheless, we think at least two answers are available to the “too 
late” argument. 
The first is that the constitutional legitimacy of the administrative 
state rests on a set of awkward but durable intellectual compromises, 
and we want to insist that those compromises remain deserving of 
respect. Probably the most common line of argument in matters of 
administrative law and federalism has gone as follows: don’t worry 
about whatever change we are proposing, because there are still 
unshakeable bulwarks that will always be there to protect the states. 
When, for instance, the Supreme Court read the Commerce Clause so 
broadly that “interstate commerce” encompassed anything that 
looked like commerce,118 the reassuring response was that the political 
safeguards of federalism still existed—that members of the House 
and Senate are elected by states and units of states and those 
members make the laws that govern commerce.119 Similarly, when 
Congress started creating agencies that would have broad 
rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement authority, and thus 
seemed to both delegate legislative power to entities outside 
Congress and to combine legislative, judicial, and executive authority 
in ways that seemed in tension with the separation of powers, the 
reassuring response was that these agencies would not supplant 
Congress or act on their own and judicial review would keep the 
agencies within their statutory bounds.120 Congress would still make 
 
 118. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 119. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 15, at 546–52 (discussing the “crucial role [of the states] 
in the selection and the composition of the national authority”); Kramer, supra note 20, at 234–
52 (updating Wechsler’s argument). 
 120. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 143 (“Broad delegations of power to regulatory 
agencies . . . have been allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to 
ensure agency fidelity to [Congress’s] statutory directives . . . .”). 
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the decision of how much authority to give to agencies, so the buck 
would stop there. 
Scholars and judges thus reconciled the administrative state with 
constitutional principles of both federalism and separation of powers 
by emphasizing the key role of Congress. There is thus something 
special about keeping the focus on Congress; that focus, in fact, is the 
irreducible minimum that allows us to swallow the institutional 
innovations of the last century. Given this intellectual history, one 
cannot infer from the present acceptance of administrative agencies 
that such agencies are substitutes for Congress or anything close to it. 
They are subservient at best and unconstitutional at worst—that is, 
whenever they lose their vital connection to the People’s elected 
representatives. 
To be sure, intermediate positions are often somewhat jerry-
rigged affairs, risking the appearance of ad hockery. We have said 
that preemption decisions must be “meaningfully traceable” to 
Congress itself—a formula that would hardly be self-applying in 
practical contexts.121 But even if we could identify a more specific limit 
on shifting preemptive power to agencies, why draw the line there 
and not somewhere else? The anti-Frostians might say that once we 
have allowed agencies to exist, we have given up on our principles 
and thus our ability to take a principled stand—in for a penny, in for a 
pound. 
Again, this is an intellectually plausible position. But it does not 
reflect the dominant current of American constitutional thought over 
the past three quarters of a century. The administrative state has 
always rested on awkward compromises, and our insistence on 
Congress’s primacy is firmly grounded in that settlement. The 
positions advanced by Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger here 
may offer an advance in terms of intellectual purity, but they risk 
untethering the administrative state from its established intellectual 
moorings. If the understanding we outlined in the previous paragraph 
is not operative, then one must return to the status quo ante and 
discuss the legitimacy of the basic institutional arrangements upon 
which one’s ideas are premised. One cannot, in our view, shove 
Congress aside without justifying the constitutional vision that 
renders that action legitimate. 
 
 121. One of us has tried to flesh out this principle elsewhere, see Young, Executive 
Preemption, supra note 23, at 886–88, but Professor Benjamin would no doubt flesh it out quite 
differently—thereby underscoring the difficulty of the enterprise. 
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Our second rejoinder emphasizes continuing ferment rather than 
settled understandings. Although the basic legitimacy of the 
administrative state is no longer in doubt, practically speaking, not all 
questions are so settled. This is particularly true in the area of 
administrative federalism, in which the Supreme Court is just 
beginning to explore the relationship between its administrative law 
jurisprudence and its doctrines protecting state autonomy. The Court 
has not, for example, definitively settled the level of deference owing 
to an agency when it reads its organic statute to preempt state law,122 
and it has yet to consider the effect of broadly preemptive 
“preambles” issued by an agency with relatively tenuous grounding in 
the underlying statute. These are questions that can still go either 
way. Indeed, it seems fair to say that the proagency positions on these 
issues—which would, for instance, largely supplant the current 
widespread use of state tort law as a supplementary mechanism for 
promoting consumer safety—pose the greater danger to settled 
expectations. 
The two of us may disagree over the extent to which 
consolidating regulatory authority over product safety or similar 
issues would be a good thing. We are content to agree, however, that 
it would be a new thing. It may be fair to say that “that ship has 
sailed” when speaking of basic delegations of authority to federal 
agencies. But on the finer points of administrative federalism, we still 
have time to bomb those ships in the harbor. 
III.  PROTECTING FEDERALISM IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Thus far we have argued that the focus of administrative 
federalism doctrine should remain on Congress, because that is where 
the Constitution focuses. In this last Part, we broaden our own focus 
from the issue of fidelity to hardwired constitutional mechanisms to 
an assessment of how an “administrative law”–based approach might 
affect underlying constitutional values of federalism. We suggest, 
first, that downplaying Congress’s role would undermine state 
autonomy to a greater degree than our interlocutors seem to think. 
Second, we consider the potential benefits to state autonomy of 
administrative law protections, if those protections are added as a 
 
 122. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) (avoiding the 
question as “academic”). 
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supplement to, rather than a substitute for, an insistence on 
Congress’s primary role. 
Our discussion in this Part is complicated by a normative 
disagreement about the desirability of protecting state autonomy per 
se. One of us believes that constitutional fidelity means adherence not 
only to particular institutional mechanisms in the text (e.g., 
Congress’s lead role in lawmaking) but also to the Constitution’s 
underlying commitment to balance between national and state 
power.123 The other denies the pull of such broader structural 
principles and is skeptical that state autonomy warrants protection as 
a normative matter. This disagreement has implications for how we 
view both the current doctrine that our interlocutors would 
undermine and the administrative law-based safeguards for 
federalism that they would develop. Throughout this Part, we try to 
make explicit where we differ and how those differences cash out. 
A. Congress and the Procedural Safeguards of Federalism 
The Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress and 
creates difficult hurdles for legislative action. These textual provisions 
are critical elements of the Constitution’s protection of federalism. As 
Bradford Clark has explained, these procedures safeguard federalism 
in two distinct respects. The first is representational or political in 
nature: 
Federal lawmaking procedures safeguarded federalism . . . by 
assigning power to adopt “the supreme Law of the Land” solely to 
entities subject to “the political safeguards of federalism”—that is, 
the states’ “strategic role to the selection of Congress and the 
President.” These procedures enhanced the influence of the states 
by giving federal institutions designed to represent state interests—
such as the Senate—a veto over all forms of federal 
lawmaking . . . .124 
This is the familiar “political safeguards of federalism” argument that 
Herbert Wechsler popularized125 and the Supreme Court endorsed in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.126 But as 
 
 123. See generally Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1762–75. 
 124. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1321, 1330–31 (2001) (quoting Wechsler, supra note 15, at 544). 
 125. See Wechsler, supra note 15, passim. 
 126. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–54 (1985). 
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Professor Clark points out, federal lawmaking procedures also serve a 
distinct function: “[t]hese procedures safeguard federalism on one 
level simply by requiring agreement among multiple actors, thus 
making the ‘Constitution,’ ‘Laws,’ and ‘Treaties’ of the United States 
relatively difficult to adopt.”127 
It is true, as Carlos Vázquez recently pointed out,128 that the 
difficulty of navigating the national lawmaking process simply 
entrenches the status quo at the federal level by making changes to 
federal law difficult. If the federal government is already regulating in 
a given area, these inertia-based limits may thus entrench federal 
power by thwarting devolutionary impulses that might return 
authority to the states. Relying on federal inertia to protect state 
autonomy thus entails a predictive judgment about the relative 
frequency of federal initiatives that expand or contract national 
power. We are fairly comfortable, however, in predicting that the 
former will exceed the latter in both frequency and importance. 
We refer to the two principles we have identified as the 
“political” and “procedural” safeguards of federalism, respectively. 
These lawmaking procedures were never intended to be the only 
constitutional means of protecting state autonomy, of course. The 
Framers also relied upon the doctrine of enumerated powers, 
underscored by the Tenth Amendment’s command that “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”129 But contemporaneous commentary underscores the 
central place of the Constitution’s lawmaking procedures in the 
Framers’ strategy for protecting federalism.130 
 
 127. Clark, supra note 124, at 1330; see also MARTHA DERTHICK, KEEPING THE 
COMPOUND REPUBLIC: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN FEDERALISM 28 (2001) (observing that inertia-
based limits on federal action protect state autonomy because “[t]he states are the ‘default 
setting’ of the American federal system”); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: 
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 32–33) (discussing federalism implications of the 
“enactment costs” of federal legislation). 
 128. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4–5). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600–01 (1995) 
(invalidating the federal Gun Free School Zones Act as outside the limits of Congress’s 
Commerce Power); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (stating that “[t]he 
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated”). 
 130. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45 & 46, at 311, 317–18 (James Madison) (emphasizing 
the importance of the states’ representation in the federal lawmaking process); Letter from 
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Neither the political nor the procedural safeguards inherent in 
the lawmaking process work very well if law is, in fact, made in other 
ways.131 Hence, the Court’s delegation decisions continue to insist that 
“when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies 
Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to 
conform.’”132 Likewise, the modern Court has kept its focus firmly on 
Congress when considering the scope and validity of federal 
intrusions on state autonomy.133 And although the Court has held that 
Congress may regulate “the states as states,” even when they are 
performing traditional state government functions,134 the Court has 
also required a clear statement of Congress’s intent to accomplish 
such regulation: 
[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political 
process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of 
Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain 
that Congress intended such an exercise. “To give the state-
displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity 
would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia 
relied to protect states’ interests.”135 
 
James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
383, 395–96 (1910) (“As a security of the rights & powers of the States in their individual 
capacities, ag[ainst] an undue preponderance of the powers granted to the Government over 
them in their united capacity, the Constitution has relied on . . . [t]he responsibility of the 
Senators and Representatives in the Legislature of the U. S. to the Legislatures & people of the 
States.”); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348–51 (James Madison) (emphasizing that 
checks and balances, including checks built into the lawmaking process, would preserve balance 
among competing institutions); Clark, supra note 124, at 1346–67 (surveying the founding 
debates over the Supremacy Clause and the Constitution’s lawmaking procedures). 
 131. Clark, supra note 124, at 1331 (explaining that these institutional dynamics “suggest 
that the Founders understood constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures to establish the 
exclusive means of adopting ‘the supreme Law of the Land’”). 
 132. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (alteration in original) 
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Loving v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (“It does not suffice to say that Congress announced its 
will to delegate certain authority. . . . The intelligible-principle rule seeks to enforce the 
understanding that Congress may not delegate the power to make laws and so may delegate no 
more than the authority to make policies and rules that implement its statutes.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1572 (2007) (holding a state 
banking law preempted but focusing on the statutory text, not the agency’s judgment). 
 134. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985). 
 135. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (quoting LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 480 (2d ed. 1988)); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between 
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In preemption cases, the Court continues to invoke—and, somewhat 
more sporadically, to follow—a “presumption against preemption,” 
which holds that “[i]n areas of traditional state regulation, we assume 
that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has 
made such an intention ‘clear and manifest.’”136 Likewise, the Court 
has been unwilling to defer to administrative agency interpretations 
of federal statutes when those readings supplant state authority in 
fields of traditional state regulation,137 and it has held that preemptive 
federal regulation at the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power 
must come from the legislative body itself, not an administrative 
agency.138 
Note that nothing we have said so far dictates how we should 
determine Congress’s intent, and we think reasonable minds can 
differ. One might decide, for example, simply to use ordinary 
methods of statutory construction to determine whether Congress 
intended to preempt or to give an agency the power of preemption. 
Indeed, the two of us disagree as to the desirability of the various 
clear statement rules just invoked. One of us is a big fan, who has 
defended clear statement requirements as “resistance norms” that can 
compensate for the underenforcement of federalism and other 
structural values;139 for him, clear statement rules form the 
cornerstone of a viable approach to judicial enforcement of 
 
the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear 
in the language of the statute.’” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 
(1985))). 
 136. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 137. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914–22, 925 (2006) (rejecting the attorney 
general’s interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act to ban physician assisted suicide, in 
part, because “such an obscure grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally supervised by 
the States’ police power” was unlikely). 
 138. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 172 (2001) (“Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of 
Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”). Similar 
clear statement rules apply when Congress supplants neutral state procedural rules in 
association with federal claims brought in state court, see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 
(1990), when Congress, in the exercise of its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, 
abrogates state sovereign immunity from private suits for money damages, see Atascadero, 473 
U.S. at 242, and when Congress affixes conditions to grants of federal funds, see Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006). 
 139. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation 
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000). 
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federalism.140 The other of us remains skeptical of canons of 
construction and would prefer to ascertain the intent of Congress 
through more traditional modes of statutory construction.141 But we 
do agree that the Court’s employment of clear statement rules in a 
variety of contexts reflects the traditional—and in our view plainly 
correct—notion that Congress must make the critical decisions 
concerning the federal/state balance.142 Our disagreement is about 
how Congress’s intent should be ascertained, not where the focus of 
inquiry should lie. 
We also agree that, by minimizing Congress’s role, Professors 
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger would substantially undermine the 
states’ position. The constitutionally-mandated lawmaking process 
protects state autonomy in two distinct respects—politically and 
procedurally—and the arguments of our interlocutors only go to one 
of them.143 If the states really do have significant opportunities to 
press their interests and exercise political leverage within the federal 
administrative process, that might ameliorate concerns about 
circumventing the political safeguards in Congress. But Professors 
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger all concede that it is far easier to enact 
federal law through administrative processes than through 
legislation.144 Agency action, quite simply, leaves the inertia-driven 
procedural safeguards of federalism in the dust. 
The two of us are not completely on the same page concerning 
the desirability, as a policy matter, of these inertia-based safeguards. 
But we do agree that they play a major role in the constitutional 
scheme for protecting federalism. The difficulty of enacting federal 
law is what fuels the basic presupposition of our system that 
[f]ederal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a 
legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal 
 
 140. See Young, Two Federalisms, supra note 48, at 123–27. For a particular application of 
this approach to administrative federalism, see generally Young, Executive Preemption, supra 
note 23. 
 141. For an example of this approach to administrative law, see generally Benjamin & Rai, 
supra note 48. 
 142. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“In traditionally sensitive areas, 
such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that 
the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in 
the judicial decision.” (emphasis added)). 
 143. See supra Part III.A. 
 144. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 1971; Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra 
note 79, at 738. 
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systems of the states. . . . Congress acts, in short, against the 
background of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way 
that a state legislature acts against the background of the common 
law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation.145 
To the extent that this “interstitial” view of federal law has become 
dated,146 that development is largely owing to the advent of 
nonlegislative lawmaking processes, including not only administrative 
agency action but also federal common lawmaking, which evade the 
burdens of overcoming inertia inherent in the Article I legislative 
process. It is important to recognize, in assessing the administrative 
process’s adequacy as a federalism surrogate, that that process 
provides little substitute for the procedural safeguards of federalism. 
B. The Administrative Safeguards of Federalism? 
We have argued that, in administrative federalism cases, the 
focus should be on exactly what Congress authorized the agencies to 
do. That is what we believe the Constitution commands. Functional 
considerations at the agency level are interesting, and they are 
important in lots of situations. But we believe that the first question 
in any analysis must be what Congress intended. 
By eliding this question, Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and 
Metzger leave us in a strange place. If the Constitution does not 
constrain (as opposed to merely suggest ideas to) Congress and 
agencies, what meaningful limit exists? A doctrine from 
administrative law is illustrative here. The Administrative Procedure 
Act says that its constraints do not apply if “agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”147 The Court has found that 
this exception arises “in those rare instances where ‘statutes are 
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to 
apply.’”148 In such situations, the Court has held that it cannot impose 
any limits on the agency’s exercise of its discretion because it has no 
 
 145. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 494–95 (5th ed. 2003) 
(quoting the first edition); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal 
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 495–98 (1954). 
 146. See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 145, at 495 (“In the fifty years since the First 
Edition was published, the expansion of federal legislation and administrative regulation . . . has 
accelerated . . . .”). 
 147. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006). 
 148. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (citing S. 
REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
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legal basis for doing so.149 It seems to us that Galle, Seidenfeld, and 
Metzger have similarly left courts (and everyone else) without any 
law to apply in considering the adequacy of agencies’ efforts to 
accommodate federalism concerns. They have suggested the 
federalism principles can give some guidance to agencies, but they 
have not indicated how we would ever determine that agencies have 
acted unlawfully. This is not necessarily a fatal flaw. In some 
situations there really is no law to apply. But here there is law to 
apply—the Constitution—and it provides some constraints. We are 
being asked to abandon those constraints and replace them with . . . 
well, nothing. 
Our view still leaves a role for functionalism. In some situations 
we might conclude that the best reading of a statute is that Congress 
delegated broad authority to an agency that it could choose to 
exercise in a variety of ways (preempting and otherwise), so there 
would be no constitutional question of the sort we are describing. 
Congress would have spoken with whatever is the requisite amount of 
clarity to the agency, and the policy question would then be whether 
we, as citizens, should want the agency to make a certain decision, or 
whether we should prefer that it be made by courts or Congress. That 
is, once the constitutional question is removed, we can discuss the 
policy question of what our preferences should be. But our point is 
that the constitutional question comes first, and only if it is answered 
in the affirmative can we then move to the normative question. 
This goes to the question of the usefulness of the sort of 
functional analysis that Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger 
engage in. The point of their analysis (and in particular Galle and 
Seidenfeld’s), is that agencies may protect state interests better than 
Congress would, so we should feel fine about agencies making 
preemption decisions on their own. In our view, this sort of analysis is 
not sufficient, and it may not even be necessary. It is not sufficient 
because, as we have noted already, no matter how solicitous agencies 
may be of states’ interests, we believe that the best understanding of 
the Constitution is that Congress must make the central judgments. 
Even if agencies were, as a factual matter, clearly superior to 
Congress in protecting states’ interests, it would not change the fact 
 
 149. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 601 (1988) (holding, in the case of a Central 
Intelligence Agency employee who was fired because of his sexual orientation, that there was 
no law to apply under the Administrative Procedure Act but the plaintiff’s constitutional claims 
were reviewable). 
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that the Constitution requires the basic decisions to be made by 
Congress. 
One of us (Professor Benjamin) would go further to say that all 
this functional analysis is not necessary because, once we have gotten 
past the initial question—that is, once we have concluded that 
Congress authorized the agency to preempt, or authorized the agency 
to decide to preempt—we do not need to consider the degree to 
which agencies protect states’ interests. The policy analysis certainly 
can include such considerations, but they are not, in any sense, 
required. This view holds that considering state interests in the mix of 
policy concerns can be a valuable element of agencies’ overall 
decisionmaking process, but it need not be a central or separable 
element. Congress should make the relevant decisions regarding 
states’ interests, and once it has done so the degree of protection of 
states provided by agencies simply is not terribly important. 
The other of us (Professor Young) thinks that the constitutional 
obligation to protect federalism is considerably more demanding.150 
That obligation includes two distinct components: first, to observe the 
entrenched structural mechanisms that the Constitution builds in, 
such as the representation of the states in Congress and the 
arduousness of the Article I legislative process; and second, to respect 
the Constitution’s more general commitment to balance the 
meaningful sovereign roles of both national and state governments. 
This latter commitment is frequently observed by institutional 
innovation outside the canonical Constitution—for example, when 
the federal courts formulate judge-made abstention doctrines that 
protect the role of the state courts.151 Although this view has been 
developed primarily in the context of the courts’ obligation to 
formulate federalism-protective doctrine, the political branches take 
the same oath to preserve the Constitution and, in fact, have 
frequently observed that obligation by promulgating statutes, 
regulations, and practices that protect federalism in ways not directly 
mandated by the canonical document.152 The functional analysis that 
 
 150. See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1762–99. 
 151. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–54 (1971) (developing a doctrine of 
equitable abstention to protect the autonomy of state judicial proceedings from federal 
interference); Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1775–83 (discussing the 
need for and historical extent of extraconstitutional innovation to protect the federal balance). 
 152. See Young, Outside the Constitution, supra note 61, at 429–36 (discussing the roles of 
statutes and regulations in defining the federal balance). 
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Professors Galle and Seidenfeld offer, and the doctrinal suggestions 
that Professor Metzger puts forward, are tremendously helpful in 
terms of vindicating these commitments.153 
We hasten to add, however, that the administrative safeguards of 
federalism will be helpful to state autonomy only if they act as a 
supplement to, not a substitute for, existing rules of Congressional 
primacy. We have already suggested that it is far from clear that 
agencies are “just as good” as Congress at protecting interests of state 
autonomy. There is a robust debate about exactly what agency 
officials maximize, and thus what sort of behavior we should expect 
from them.154 This debate has been largely theoretical, as it is difficult 
to construct rigorous empirical benchmarks for testing various 
theories of officials’ motivations. But the lack of empirical clarity 
about officials’ goals should not obscure the historical reality of the 
increase in agencies’ power, often at the expense of states. Simply 
stated, notwithstanding Professors Seidenfeld and Galle’s abstract 
points of comparative institutional analysis, the vast expansion of the 
federal administrative state over the last century—much of it driven 
by decisions taken at the agency level—is res ipsa loquitur. Moreover, 
this expansion has occurred despite the existence of both the judicial 
focus on grounding administrative activity in congressional action and 
the federalism-protective features of the agency process itself that 
Galle and Seidenfeld invoke. Galle and Seidenfeld give us no reason 
to conclude that, despite the spotty record of both sets of safeguards 
in limiting national aggrandizement, removing one of those 
safeguards will enhance state autonomy. 
Likewise, although Professor Metzger offers a creative and 
extremely interesting glimpse of administrative law’s potential to 
protect federalism, we expect she would acknowledge that the 
 
 153. See Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 48, at 1771–75 (suggesting that 
courts may well have a constitutional obligation to formulate federalism-protective doctrines to 
compensate for the enumerated powers doctrine’s failure to constrain national authority). 
 154. Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 114 (1971) (arguing that agency officials will expand their budgets and power 
because “the coterminous relation of a bureaucrat’s rewards and his position implies that a 
bureaucrat will maximize the total budget of his bureau”), with Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-
Building in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932 (2005) (disagreeing with the agency 
“empire-building hypothesis,” and stating that “[e]ven if most bureaucrats were primarily 
interested in lining their own pockets, the relationship between a larger agency budget and 
higher salaries or cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous”); see also Stuart Minor 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2008) (manuscript at 41–44) (discussing this debate). 
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evidence that administrative law actually plays this role at present is 
pretty thin. The cases she discusses are not all that encouraging. The 
federalism-protective aspect of Alaska Department of Environmental 
Conservation v. EPA155 was offered in dissent.156 Gonzales v. Oregon157 
involved a particularly blatant power grab by executive officials 
seeking to do what Congress had explicitly refused to do and involved 
a particularly sensitive area of state policy experimentation;158 if 
anything, the Court’s opinions distressingly suggest the case was 
closer than it should have been.159 Massachusetts v. EPA160 was a case 
about standing, not regulatory authority, and the special role of the 
states played a relatively minor role in the decision.161 And both 
Gonzales v. Raich162 and Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.163 were big 
defeats for state regulatory autonomy. We always respect the ability 
to make lemonade out of the lemons life gives you, but these are the 
cases from which we are supposed to conclude that administrative law 
will protect federalism? 
CONCLUSION 
There is perhaps an irony in our critique of Professors Galle, 
Seidenfeld, and Metzger: one of us (the hidebound Burkean) would 
require a clear statement from Congress before interpreting a statute 
as giving an agency the authority to preempt or the authority to 
decide to preempt. The other one (the Jacobin) would not require 
any sort of clear statement and would instead resort to ordinary tools 
of statutory construction. So, in reality, our interpretive techniques 
would yield different answers in many (perhaps most) cases. But we 
 
 155. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
 156. See id. at 517–18 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 157. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006). 
 158. See id. at 911 (acknowledging the “earnest and profound debate about the morality, 
legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 735 (1997))). 
 159. Three Justices dissented, after all. See id. at 926 (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & 
Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 160. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
 161. See id. at 1454–55 (discussing Massachusetts’s “special position” as a litigant rather than 
a regulator for standing purposes). 
 162. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (interpreting the Commerce Clause 
broadly to permit federal regulation of homegrown marijuana use, thereby nullifying 
California’s medical marijuana). 
 163. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1573 (2007) (holding that the 
National Banking Act leaves little room for state regulation of the “business of banking”). 
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agree on the foundational interpretive point that the constitutional 
decisions to employ certain mechanisms are just as mandatory as the 
underlying values that those decisions seek to protect. Expanding this 
institutional array is often permissible and may even be essential, but 
this element of realism does not legitimate marginalizing the 
institutions that the Constitution does specify. To the extent that 
Galle, Seidenfeld, and Metzger shift the focus away from Congress’s 
role in the lawmaking process to that of administrative agencies, they 
exceed the limits of constitutional flexibility. We want to keep the 
focus where the Constitution does. 
